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Abstract—Wireless signals contain transmitter specific fea-
tures, which can be used to verify the identity of transmitters
and assist in implementing an authentication and authorization
system. Most recently, there has been a wide interest in using deep
learning for transmitter identification. However, the existing deep
learning work has posed the problem as closed set classification,
where a neural network classifies among a finite set of known
transmitters. No matter how large this set is, it will not include all
transmitters that exist. Malicious transmitters outside this closed
set, once within communications range, can jeopardize the system
security. In this paper, we propose a deep learning approach for
transmitter authorization based on open set recognition. Our
proposed approach identifies a set of authorized transmitters,
while rejecting any other unseen transmitters by recognizing their
signals as outliers. We propose three approaches for this problem
and show their ability to reject signals from unauthorized trans-
mitters on a dataset of WiFi captures. We consider the structure
of training data needed, and we show that the accuracy improves
by having signals from known unauthorized transmitters in the
training set.
Index Terms—Transmitter Identification, Deep Learning, Open
set recognition, authorization, physical layer authentication
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growth in the number of wirelessly connected
devices, securing them has become more challenging. Part
of securing wireless devices is authentication; the process of
verifying their identity. While there exist many cryptography
based methods for authentication, they are not suitable for
many internet-of-things devices that have limited computation
and power budget.
Physical layer authentication (PLA) enables devices to be
authenticated without having to decode the data and typically
without requiring additional signaling overhead [1]. Active
PLA overlays a tag for authentication over the message thus
requiring changes to the physical layer of the transmitters.
Passive PLA, on the other hand, uses the channel state
information and the transmitter fingerprint due to hardware
imperfections to identify transmitters [2], requiring no change
to transmitter signals, and hence is more practical.
Approaches for passive PLA either use a set of handcrafted
features or deep learning on raw IQ samples. For feature-
based PLA, existing works have considered using transmitter
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fingerprints due to hardware imperfections [3] or channel state
information (CSI) [4]. Learning approaches based on hand-
crafted features rejecting new transmitters have used Gaussian
mixture models [4]–[7]. However, the performance of these
approaches depends on the receiver quality [8] and requires
manual feature engineering.
In contrast, deep learning approaches are more robust and
can extract better features from signals, hence leading to
higher accuracy compared to feature-based approaches [9].
The existing work in the literature has considered the effect
of data representation, neural network architecture, and the
wireless channel on the classification accuracy [9]–[17]. Ex-
amples of data representations include raw IQ samples [9]–
[11], [15], Fourier transform [12], [16], and Wavelet transform
[12], [17]. The robustness of the learned features in different
channels has also been considered [10]. Network architectures
evaluated include DNN [17], CNN [9], [16], [17], RNN [14],
and complex neural networks [13]. The main limitation of
this body of work is its focus on classification among a
closed set of known transmitters. Any transmitter outside
this set will be misclassified, hence, jeopardizing the system
security. The problem of classifying among known classes
and rejecting samples from new classes is known as open
set recognition [18]. Many approaches have been proposed
to address it in other domains like image classification.
In this paper, we pose the problem of rejecting signals from
any transmitter outside a known authorized set as an open set
recognition problem. Since this problem was studied exten-
sively, instead of reinventing the wheel, we aim to adapt and
evaluate well-established approaches for transmitter authoriza-
tion. Since the number of authorized transmitters is a system
requirement that can vary significantly, we study how these
approaches scale in terms of performance and network size
with it. To further improve the performance, we propose using
a set of known unauthorized transmitters and demonstrate its
effectiveness in improving outlier detection. Our results show
an average accuracy of 96.8% when separating signals of 10
authorized transmitters and 30 unseen transmitters when using
a set of 25 known outliers for training using a WiFi capture.
The problem of open set recognition is more challenging
than closed set classification. A closed set classifier determines
boundaries that separate the classes it has seen, as shown with
the solid blue line in Fig. 1. But, given data from new classes
(new unauthorized transmitters), the classifier will predict the©2020 IEEE
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Fig. 1: Known classes are depicted as circles and unknown
classes as squares. Solid lines and dashed circles represent
classification boundaries and open set recognition, respec-
tively.
...
Authorized
Open
Set
Fig. 2: Signal y is received by receiver R. We want to
determine if it was sent by an authorized transmitter in the
set A or a new unseen transmitter.
nearest class, which poses a security risk for an authentication
system. On the other hand, open set classification creates
boundaries around the seen distribution, as illustrated with
the red dashed circles in Fig. 1, for rejecting samples from
new classes. Unlike feature based approaches [4]–[7] which
use well separated features like CSI, our approach needs to
learn the features that separate authorized transmitters from
transmitters for which no training data is available.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: we start
by formulating the problem in Section II. Section III discuses
the considered machine learning approaches. The dataset, the
architecture, and the results are presented in Section IV.
Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a finite set of authorized transmitters given by
A = {A1, A2, · · · , A|A|} that are authorized to send data to
a receiver R, where |A| is the size of the set A. When a
transmitter T sends a set of symbols x, the signal received
is fT (x). The function fT models the transmitter fingerprint
determined by the variability of its circuit and also includes
the effects of the channel. The authorization problem can be
formulated as shown in Fig. 2: receiver R receives a signal y
from some transmitter T and wants to determine whether the
transmitter T belongs to the authorized set or not, based on y.
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Fig. 3: Architecture of the proposed methods.
This can be formulated as the following hypothesis testing:
H0 : y = fT (x), T ∈ A
H1 : y = fT (x), T /∈ A
(1)
Here, H0 corresponds to an authorized transmitter and H1
corresponds to an outlier.
Additionally, in cases where each authorized transmitter has
different privileges, we might be interested in classifying the
transmitter within the authorized set, which can be formulated
as finding Aˆ that maximizes the probability of identifying the
true transmitter
Aˆ = argmax
T
Pr(fT (x) = y | y), T ∈ A (2)
To improve the outlier detection, we propose using an
additional class of known outliers K = {K1,K2, · · · ,K|K|},
where K 6⊂ A. Samples from transmitters in K will be used
during training to assist the outlier detector to differentiate
between authorized and non-authorized transmitters. But still,
the evaluation of any outlier detector is done using a set of
unknown outliers O such that O∩K = ∅. In practice, samples
from the set K can be obtained by capturing data from a finite
number of non-authorized transmitters.
III. MACHINE LEARNING APPROACH
In this section, we discuss the neural network architectures
used to solve this problem and the processing performed
on the output of these networks to decide if a signal is an
outlier. We consider several neural network architectures for
outlier detection. These networks consist of a feature extractor
followed by one or many classifiers. In terms of training, some
of these networks need known outliers to generalize to unseen
transmitters, while others don’t. We also discuss how the size
of A affects the number of parameters of these networks.
1) Discriminator (Disc): One intuitive approach for outlier
detection is to train a discriminator that outputs a decision on
whether the signal is an outlier or not. The discriminator has
a single scalar output z as shown in Fig. 3a. z is generated
by a sigmoid and takes a value between 0 and 1. The labels
for authorized transmitters and outliers are l = 0 and l =
1, respectively. Samples with l = 1 used in training are the
known outliers, which are necessary for this approach. In the
test phase, we declare H1 if z > γ for some threshold γ,
else H0 is declared. In terms of architecture, Disc has the
advantage of having a fixed size regardless of |A|. Although
this approach does not classify the authorized transmitters, a
classifier can be cascaded with a discriminator to achieve this
but is not discussed in this work.
2) Discriminating Classifier (DClass): Instead of cascading
a discriminator and a classifier, we can directly train a network
with |A| + 1 outputs, where the additional class corresponds
to outliers. Similar to Disc this approache relies on K for
training. As for deciding on outliers, a signal is classified as an
outlier if the maximum activation corresponds to the last class,
else it is considered authorized without adjustable thresholds.
In comparison with Disc, the labels of the transmitters are
expected to help DClass learn better features and hence
perform better. This comes at the cost of increasing the size
of the last layer as |A| increases.
3) One Vs All (OvA): A simple way to modify Disc to
include classification with modifiable thresholds is to use |A|
instances of it; one for each transmitter. However, this method
requires a high computational complexity due to having |A|
feature extractors performing the same task. A better approach,
proposed in [19], is shown in Fig. 3c. In this approach, we
use |A| binary classifiers, each deciding for a transmitter while
sharing the same feature extractor. The output of this network
will be a vector z of |A| real numbers such that 0 ≤ z ≤
1, where 0 and 1 are the vectors of all-zeros and all-ones,
respectively. Following the notation in [19], the labels for a
sample from authorized transmitter Ai will have li = 1 and
lj = 0 ∀j 6= i while known outliers will have labels equal
to 0. For this architecture, the threshold will be a vector γ ,
where element γi is the threshold for zi. The binary classifier
i decides that the input sample belongs to class i if zi > γi;
otherwise, it does not belong to class i. We declare the signal
to be an outlier (corresponding to H1), if all discriminators
declare the signal to be not within their class (z ≤ γ ), and to
be within the authorized set (corresponding to H0) otherwise.
Note that OvA, unlike DClass and Disc, does not require a
known set of outliers, since for samples of any class i, li = 0
for signals from other classes. OvA, however, requires an
entire binary classifier for each authorized transmitter. hence,
among the proposed architectures, it has the worse scalability
with respect to |A|, in terms of the number of learnable
parameters.
Both OvA and Disc have adjustable thresholds. The value of
these thresholds determines their sensitivity to outliers. A tight
threshold would lead to signals from authorized transmitters
being mistakenly rejected (high probability of false alarm
PFA) and a loose threshold would fail to recognize many
outlier signals (low probability of detection PD). This trade-off
is commonly visualized by the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) showing both PFA and PD for a specific receiver. In
the Appendix, we describe how this trade-off is implemented
and state how a specific threshold is chosen to calculate the
outlier detection accuracy.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We start by describing the dataset used and evaluate the
performance of the proposed network architectures on the
dataset as we change the size and composition of A and K.
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Fig. 4: Detailed architecture of the feature extractor (made of
residual blocks with f filters), and a classifier with x outputs.
A. Dataset
The dataset was captured using off-the-shelf WiFi modules
(Atheros 5212, 9220, and 9280) as transmitters and a software
defined radio (USRP N210) as a receiver, from the Orbit
testbed [20]. The choice of the Orbit testbed is made due
to the ease of access to many transmitters using realistic
hardware while being able to isolate external environmental
disturbances. The nodes in Orbit are organized in a 20×20
grid with a separation of one meter; the receiver was chosen
near the center and 71 transmitters were randomly chosen,
to make many nodes experience similar channels due to the
symmetry.
The capture was done over Channel 11 which has a center
frequency of 2462 MHz and a bandwidth of 20 MHz. All
transmitters were configured to have the same fake MAC
address and same IP address to avoid providing any signal
based clues about the identity of the transmitter. Captures
were taken at a rate of 25 Msps for one second. After the
IQ capture was complete, the packets were extracted using
energy detection. The number of packets obtained from each
transmitter during the capture period varied between 200 and
1500 packets with a mean of 800 packets. This variability
is due to WiFi rate control. From each packet, we used
the first 256 samples, containing the preamble, without any
synchronization or further preprocessing.
B. Network Architectures and Training
We consider the three previously proposed architectures
Disc, DClass, and OvA. As stated earlier, these architectures
consist of a feature extractor that processes the raw IQ samples
and outputs features, followed by a number of classifier blocks.
Our focus in this paper is on the approach, not the architecture,
so, we used the same feature extractor for all networks. The
feature extractor consists of a series of residual blocks with
different numbers of filters as shown in Fig. 4. As for the
classifier blocks, the architecture for each block is shown in
Fig. 4. This network was chosen because similar networks
have shown superior performance to CNNs on a similar
problem [21]. For Disc, we used one classifier with a sigmoid
activation. For OvA, we used N of the classifier blocks with
each block similar to that of Disc. As for DClass, we used one
classifier block with |A| + 1 outputs and softmax activation.
L2 regularization was used in the dense layers with a weight
of 0.001 to avoid overfitting.
Note that for OvA and DClass the number of parameters
of the neural network increases as the size of |A| increases.
In OvA, for each new authorized transmitter, a new instance
of the classifier is added to the architecture with about 80K
parameters. For DClass, the size of the last layer increases by
81 parameters for each authorized transmitter. As for Disc, the
number of parameters is constant for any |A|.
The training was done for 10 epochs using the ADAM
optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001. The weights with the
lowest validation loss are kept. Samples was first normalized,
then augmented by adding noise with a variance of 0.01 and
applying a uniformly random phase shift. Cross-Entropy was
used as the loss function with classes weighted depending on
the number of samples for each class.
C. Transmitter Set Sizes Evaluation
Ideally, we want to train our network using the set of
authorized nodes only, regardless of their number. Creating
a known outlier set K would require more transmitters and
more data collection. In this section, we explore the effect
of changing the size of the authorized set |A|, and the size
of the known outlier set |K|, on the ability of the network
to distinguish authorized signals from outliers. We start by
describing the evaluation metrics and dataset division.
1) Evaluation Metrics and Dataset Division: Since certain
subsets of the set of transmitters in our dataset might have
more mutually similar signals than others, we try to make
our results less specific to a chosen subset of transmitters.
To this end, we randomly populate the sets A, K, and O
from the 71 transmitters 10 times in each test we conduct.
Results are shown as mean and standards deviation of these
10 realizations. The metrics used for the evaluation of outlier
detection are the accuracy and area under the ROC curve
(AUC). The accuracy is the percentage of correct predictions
calculated over a balanced test set, such that any random
or trivial guess would yield 50% accuracy. The area under
the ROC curve provides a metric of which model is better
on average [22], while the accuracy is what we get for a
specific threshold. Although DClass and OvA are capable of
classifying signals within the authorized sets, the results of
classification were above 99% on the authorized part of the
test set, and as classification has been extensively studied in
the literature, we omit these results for brevity.
Our training, validation, and test sets are built as follows:
for certain values of |A|, |K|, and |O|, we randomly choose
transmitters to form our sets A, K, and O. For training and
validation, we use 70% of the samples belonging to A, and
all the samples belonging K. The shuffled combination of this
data is split into 80% for training and 20% for validation. The
test set contains all samples from O and the remaining 30%
of A. For different realizations of the sets, the dataset can get
highly imbalanced. To avoid degenerate solutions, where the
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Fig. 6: Average performance of architectures as we change |K|
for |A| = 10. Error bars represent the standard deviation.
network always predicts the class with the majority of samples,
the training loss is weighted.
2) Authorized set: We study how the size of the set A
affects outlier detection by considering OvA with no known
outliers, |K| = 0. Results are shown in Fig. 5 for |O| = 30; we
see that as we increase the number of authorized nodes, the
AUC increases and its standard deviation decreases. In OvA,
to generalize to unseen transmitters, binary classifier i needs
to learn the unique features of transmitter i. Seeing signals
from more transmitters helps it realize that leading to a better
AUC. The accuracy is shown in Fig. 5b, from which we can
see that accuracy follows the same trend, except at the point
with 25 and 40 authorized transmitters. At these points, the
chosen threshold for one realization resulted in a low accuracy,
decreasing the mean and increasing the standard deviation.
This shows that for specific combinations of authorized and
outlier nodes, and a given threshold, we might get lower
performance. Since the value of the AUC is high, this shows
that another threshold would give a better performance. From
these results, we can see that the average accuracy does not
go over 90%, while it fluctuates depending on the choice of
transmitters for the same method of selecting thresholds.
3) Known set: To further improve performance, we propose
using known outliers to help the approaches generalize to
unseen transmitters. We evaluate the performance of all ar-
chitectures as a function of |K| given |A| = 10 and |O| = 26.
The AUC and accuracy curves are shown in Fig. 6a and
6b respectively. As stated earlier, at |K| = 0, DClass and
Disc don’t have any outlier samples and predict everything
as authorized. From Fig. 6a, we see that the performance
of both OvA and Disc improves as we increase the number
of known outliers. We note that OvA is performing better.
This is explained by recognizing that in OvA each binary
classifier sees more samples to reject; the known outliers and
the samples not belonging to its class. Thus, it is able to
isolate its class better. DClass and Disc, on the other hand,
only learn to reject samples from K. Fig 6b follows the same
trend with OvA reaching accuracies up to 96% on average.
DClass slightly outperforms Disc because the labels of A
help it extract better features compared to Disc. So even if
we are not interested in classifying among the nodes in A,
including these labels in training improves the outlier detection
performance. In the case with |K| = 0, we were not able to
attain accuracies above 90% on average, showing that using
additional unauthorized transmitters in data collection can lead
to significant improvements.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we formulated transmitter authorization as
an open set classification problem where we learn to reject
signals from new transmitters not seen during training. We
considered three approaches to solve it. OvA does not require
known outliers and gives better performance, at the cost of
a large increase in the neural network size with the size
of the authorized set. DClass and Disc need a large set of
known outliers for training to get good performance, with Disc
having a slightly lower performance with the advantage of
maintaining a constant network size regardless of the number
of authorized nodes. In all cases, we have shown that having a
set of known outliers improves performance. So far, we have
only considered a residual neural network. Further work needs
to be carried out to understand the effect of changing the neural
network type and architecture for open set recognition.
APPENDIX
For OvA and Disc, we describe how the threshold used for
accuracy is calculated along with the ROC scan.
1) Disc: Ideally, we want the threshold to be as low as
possible without falsely rejecting authorized transmitters. This
can be done by adapting the threshold to tightly fit the
predictions of authorized signals in the training set. We follow
the approach proposed in [19], where the predicted output for
the authorized (having labels equal to 0) is mirrored around
0 and fit to a Gaussian distribution having mean 0. Then, we
calculate the standard deviation σ of these samples and set the
decision threshold to γ = min(0.5, 3σ). As for obtaining the
ROC curve, we scan the value of γ from 0 to 1.
2) One Vs All (OvA): To obtain the ROC curve, we scan a
single threshold γ from 0 to 1 such that γ = γ1. To calculate
the accuracy, we use multiple thresholds designed according
to the same method of Gaussian fitting used in Disc.
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